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RECENT DECISIONS

TRADE RESTRAINTS - DuE PROCESS - INTERFERENCE WITH LIBERTY
TO FIX SALE PRICE OF GASOLINE - In 1925 the state of Iowa enacted a statute 1 requiring all distributors of gasoline in the state, wholesale or retail, to
post in plain sight the price at which they intended to sell their gasoline, setting
out all taxes thereon. They were then bound to sell at this price to all buyers.
Defendant was such a dealer, and although he posted the price, he failed to
abide by it as to all sales and was charged with violating the statute. The low1;r
court sustained defendant's demurre-rs, holding the statute unconstitutional as
a denial of due process and equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment. On appeal, held, the statute is constitutional as an appropriate
police regulation satisfying the requirements of the due process and equal protection clauses. State'll. Woitha, (Iowa, 1939) 287 N. W. 99.
The defendant challenged the authority of the state to enact this law under
its police powers, claiming such enactment infringed his liberty to contract as
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 2 Since I 884 3
the courts have recognized the freedom to contract as a fundamental liberty
of the individual, and have sought to protect it as completely as possible. However, it is well recognized that the right is not absolute, but is subject to limitations as an incident of the proper exercise of legislative powers. 4 Probably the
exercise of the police powers is the most prominent legislation affecting this
field. The proper exercise of the power has been regularly sustained in cases
where it has touched and limited individuals' right of contract, contracts of
businesses affected with public interest, and contracts involving the performance
of public works, such as the building and maintaining of highways and public
1 Iowa Acts (1925), c. 6, § 3, Code (1935), § 5093-f4; as amended by Acts
(1937), c. 136, Code (1939), § 5093.04.
2 As an additional defense, the defendant pleaded that such legislation affecting
only sellers of fuel oils and gasolines was an unreasonable classification. The court found
the classification to be reasonable, since all members of the class were treated alike.
3 Butchers' Union Slaughter-House Co. v. Crescent City Live Stock Landing Co.,
I I I U.S. 746, 4 S. Ct. 652 (1884). Justice Eield's concurring opinion referring to
the "right to pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any m~nner not inconsistent with
the equal rights of others," I I I U. S. at 757, is generally alluded to as the Court's
first recognition of the freedom to contract as protected by the due process clause. In
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 at 589, 17 S. Ct. 427 (1897), the Supreme
Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as follows: "The liberty mentioned in
that amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere
physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be
free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that
purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned."
4 " • • • no refinement of reason is necessary to demonstrate the broad power of the
legislature over the transactions of men. There are many lawful restrictions upon liberty
of contract and business." Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342 at 365, 36
S. Ct. 370 (1916). See also, National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S.
71, 43 S. Ct. 32 (1922); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34
S. Ct. 612 (1914).
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buildings.5 The specific right to contract asserted here is the individual one of
setting one's own price in each particular sale of gasoline. It has been successfully contended that price-setting should be no more inviolable or sacrosanct than
any other element of a contract. As regards price control, the cases seem to fall
into two classifications: (I) those involving a state commission created by statute
to determine the price at which the particular enterprise or individual may sell
his products,6 and ( 2) those involving statutes allowing the enterprise or individual to set his own price, but forbidding an alteration of the same in such a
way to result in discrimination for or against any purchasers.7 The former type
has required that ·the business be "affected with public interest" before it is subject to regulation. However, in 1934, the Nebbia case 8 affirmatively dismissed
all prior distinctions between "businesses affected with public interest" and
ordinary private businesses in so far as the right of the legislature to regulate
is concerned. Justice Roberts, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said that
"affected with public interest" means "no more than that an industry, for
adequate reasons, is subject to control for the public good." 9 Since that time, the
courts have, as a rule, looked only for the normal requirements of due process 10
where price control was involved, and no longer for "public interest'' as previously interpreted. The second classification, prohibiting discrimination only, is
the category in which the principal case falls. In such class the element of "public
interest" has not been required as a foundation for the regulation,11 as it involves a milder type of regulation, and does not provide for actual price fixing
by the state. Of course, refusal to permit sales to particular customers at prices
the dealer desires is an invasion of his freedom to contract; but, since the state
has power to legislate for the public welfare and convenience,12 and since it is
5

White, "Constitutional Protection of Liberty of Contract:- Does It Still Exist?"

83 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 4z5 (1935). On pages 4z9-43z is a complete discussion of the
three types of permissible contractual infringements mentioned, together with relevant
cases and holdings.
6 German Alliance Ins: Co. v. Lewis, z33 U. S. 389, 34 S. Ct. 61z (1914);
United Theatre Ticket Office Inc. v. Banton, z73 U. S. 418, 47 S. Ct. 4z6 (19z7);
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., z78 U. S. z35, 49 S. Ct. II5 (19z9).
7 State ex rel. Young v. Standard Oil Co., III Minn. 85, IZ6 N. W. 5z7 (1910);
Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, zz6 U. S. 157, 33 S. Ct. 66 (191z); Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, z74 U. S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 506 (19z7).
8 Nebbia v. New York, z91 U. S. 5oz, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934). Here the state
commission was allowed to fix certain prices in the milk industry, although the latter
is not a public utility but a private enterprise.
9 Ibid., z91 U. S. at 536.
10 These are: (a) an object subject to regulation, i.e., within the legislative powers;
(b) that the means adopted by the legislature shall have reasonable relation to the
object; (c) that the legislation is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. See comment,
35 M1cH. L. REV. 98z (1937).
11 RoTTSCHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 488 (1939). See cases cited in note
7, supra.
12 "We hold the police power of a State embraces regulations designed to promote
the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, the public morals or the public safety." Chicago B. & Q. Ry.
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established that the prevention of unfair competition falls into this class,18 the
particular ends in view here justify an exercise of the police powers. However,
one element of the statute in the principal case makes its constitutionality questionable. The evident purpose of the act, as in case of several comparable acts,1'
is, according to the Iowa court, to prevent unfair competition in the form of
price discrimination, thereby discouraging any attempts to create a monopoly
in the retailing of gasoline. While one might sell at a variety of prices to accomplish such ends, he might, on the other hand, be so acting merely to meet
normal trade fluctuations, due to changing supply and demand. Thus, statutes
prohibiting price variations usually provide that such sales must be made with
"improper intent" in order to constitute a violation, and such statutes have
usually been upheld.15 The Iowa statute contains no such provision as to intent,
and similar legislation in other states might be rendered invalid because the
innocent as well as the guilty are punished.16 These innocent parties are having
their right to freedom of contract unjustifiably infringed, and so courts have
held.17 Nevertheless, the Iowa decision is justified. Although not mentioned by
the Iowa court, the particular statute involved contains a provision for altering
the posted price every twenty-four hours if the dealer so desires, provided he
posts the price change. It is unlikely that a dealer by so doing cannot keep up
with normal trade fluctuations, and such is recognized by the statute. Hence
any alteration within a twenty-four hour period would probably be made only
with the intent to injure competitors and with a view toward creating a
monopoly. Thus violations of this act would generally be only by those with an
improper intent. However, had the statute lacked the twenty-four hour provision,
it is highly questionable whether it could be sustained under the due process
clause.
v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage. Commissioners, 200 U. S. 561 at 592, 26 S. Ct. 341
(1906). See also, Miller v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 195 Cal. 477, 234
P. 381 (1925); People v. Associated Oil Co., 2n Cal. 93, 294 P. 717 (1930).
18 Commonwealth v. Strauss, 191 Mass. 545, 78 N. E. 136 (1906), where
activities tending towards monopoly were proscribed by authority of the police power
in the field of general welfare. Also, Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U. S.
443, 30 S. Ct. 535 (1910).
14 See: Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 506 (1927);
Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 33 S. Ct. 66 (1912); State
ex rel. Young v. Standard Oil Co., III Minn. 85, 126 N. W. 527 (1910). The
Fairmont case held the statute involved unconstitutional because it applied to all
discriminatory sales irrespective of motive; the latter two cases held their respective
statutes constitutional, because each contained a provision requiring a discriminatory
sale with an intent to injure a competitor and to set up a monopoly before the statute
was violated.
15 See note 14, supra.
16 ln Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. I, 47 S. Ct. 506 (1927),
the Court would not allow such a dragnet to be administered, where the statute entailed punishing innumerable innocent parties in order to reach the few actually
committing the evil sought to be remedied.
11 Ibid. See also, Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 S. Ct. 662 (1917).

